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ADDENDUM
During the summer of 1984, subsequent to the writing of the
following Article, the United States Supreme Court issued opinions
for the two cases discussed in the Article. See United States v. Leon,
104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct.
3424 (1984). In opinions written by Justice White, who has strived
for a modification of the exclusionary rule, the Court adopted a
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The result of Leon is
that the prosecution may use evidence seized pursuant to a warrant
subsequently found to be unsupported by probable cause, so long
as the officer acted in the good faith belief that the warrant was
valid. The result of Sheppard is that a warrant defective on its face
but supported by probable cause will not invalidate the evidence so
long as the officer executing the warrant was the one who requested
it. For a discussion of Sheppard and Leon, see C. WHITEBREAD,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Supp. 1984).
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND SUPREME COURT
DECISION MAKING: SOME THOUGHTS
WHILE AWAITING SHEPPARD'
TIM GAMMON*
Citizens are guaranteed inviolability of the home. No one
may, without lawful grounds, enter a home against the
will of the residents. The privacy of citizens, their
correspondence... (and) communications is protected by
law. Citizens have the right to protection by the courts
against encroachments of their personal freedom and
property. U.S.S.R. CONST. arts. 55-57.
AB., Drury College, 1968; M. Ed., Drury College, 1970;J.D., St. Louis University, 1974;
I.,L.M., Harvard University, 1976; currently staff attorney, United States Circuit Court of Appeals
16r the Eighth Circuit.
I. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725 (1982), cert. granted, 103 S.Ct.
3534 (1983).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
[T]he letters in question were taken from the house of the
accused by an official of the United States acting under
color of his office and in direct violation of the
constitutional rights of the defendant; that having made a
seasonable application for their return, which was heard
and passed on by this court, there was involved in the
order refusing the application a denial of the
constitutional rights of the accused, and that the court
should have restored these letters to the accused. In
holding them and permitting their use upon the trial, we
think prejudicial error was committed. Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
I. INTRODUCTION
The difference between the quoted Soviet and American
constitutional provisions is the fourth amendment procedural
criteria for obtaining a warrant. Different consequences have
resulted not from the documents but from the power vested in the
American judiciary to breathe life into the words of the fourth
amendment as it did in Weeks. The exclusionary rule is again before
the Supreme Court in the 1983 term. 2 The rule has a long history of
controversy, a history that reveals much about constitutional
decision making.3
2. See id.; United States v. Leon, 701 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1983) (table), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct.
3535 (1983).
3. On the history of the fourth amendment, see generally R. DAVIS, FEDERAL SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES (1964); T. GARDNER, PRINCIPLES AND CASES OF THE LAW OF ARREST, SEARCH, AND SEIZURE
(1974); W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (1978); J.
LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966); L. KOLBEREK, THE LAW OF
ARREST, SEARCH, AND SEIZURE (1965); N. LASSON, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution in STUDIES IN HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE (1937); 8J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE SS 2183, 2184 (3d ed. 1940); Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 11 (1925); Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARV.
L. REV. 361 (1921); Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man's Land in the Criminal-Law, 49 CALIF. L.
REV. 474 (1961); Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 49; Stengel, The
Background of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 4 U. RICH. L. REV. 60 (1969);
Woody & Rosen, Fourth Amendment Viewed and Reviewed, I IS. TEX. L.J. 315 (1970).
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FOURTH AMENDMENT
History, not logic, is the key to understanding the fourth
amendment, the exclusionary rule, and the dilemma they present
of how to accommodate the individual's fourth amendment rights
and society's interest in convicting the guilty. It is difficult to tear
the strand that carries the fourth amendment and exclusionary rule
from the seamless web of Anglo-American political and legal
history. This Article presents a historical overview of the
exclusionary rule, focusing on certain touchstone events and cases.
This Article also lists the arguments for and against the rule,
discusses alternatives to the rule, and e: amines the dilemma. The
Article offers some observations on Court adjudication and
concludes with a "reaffirmation of faith" in the Supreme Court
and the exclusionary rule.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. ENGLISH LAW
The sanctity of the home provided the foundation for the
fourth amendment. 4 In England this sanctity was challenged by
general search warrants for stolen property, and by general
authorizations or commissions, employed by the time of Charles II
and the Star Chamber but refined and extended under George III,
which permitted government officers to arrest anyone and search
any place to uncover authors, printers, and publications. 5 These
roving commissions were necessary, the Crown reasoned, to
protect itself from seditious libel.
When Wilkes, the English libertarian, sued those officials who
sought the warrants and those officers who executed them, the
course was righted first in separate decisions issued by Lord
Camden, 6 Lord Loft,7 Lord Mansfield, 8 and Lord Pratt9 between
1763 and 1765 and finally by the House of Commons in 1766.10 In
Entick v. Carrington,"' Lord Camden recognized a relationship
4. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 379 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In his dissent,
Justice Douglas stated: "One of the most essential branches of English liberty is the freedom of one's
house. A man's house is his castle; and whilst he is quiet, he is as well guarded as a prince in his
castle." Id. (quoting W. TUDOR, LIFE OFJAMES OTIs 68 (1823)).
5. Fraenkel, supra note 3, at 362. Professor Lasson traces this sanctity from ancient times. N.
LASSON, supra note 3, at 13-50.
6. Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765). The author cites Howell's State
Trials because that is the only source that contains the full text of the decision. The case is also
reported at 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765).
7. Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763).
8. Money v. Leach, 96 Eng. Rep. 320 (1765).
9. Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763).
10. H.C.JouR. April 22 and 25(1766).
11. 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765).
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between unreasonable searches and self-incrimination by holding
that general warrants violated the principle against self-
incrimination.12  He condemned the uncertainty of general
warrants and provided the philosophical cornerstone for a right
built upon both form, requiring particular procedures in obtaining
a warrant, and substance, condemning unreasonable searches
regardless of the procedures followed.
B. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
While England was remedying the problem of general
warrants, America was plagued with writs of assistance, which
were general search commissions used to discover smugglers and
confiscate their stolen property. Excessive use of these writs
provoked attacks on the Crown by John Adams and others. 13 In
reaction to the writs, states began to outlaw general searches. 14 The
fourth amendment, taken from the 1765 Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights, grew out of these state laws and was
incorporated into the Bill of Rights (the original version, from the
Virginia Constitution, condemned only general warrants). 15
C. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The first significant United States Supreme Court
pronouncement regarding the exclusionary fourth amendment
remedy came from Justice Bradley in United States v. Boyd,16 a
forfeiture case. The opinion was noteworthy for several reasons.
12. Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765). In Entick, Lord Camden stated:
It is very certain, that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself; because the necessary
means of compelling self accusation, falling upon the innocent as well as the guilty,
would be both cruel and unjust; and it should seem, that search for evidence is
disallowed upon the same principle.
Id. at 1073.
13. See N. LASSON, supra note 3, at 51-78; Atkinson, supra note 3, at 375, 380; Fraenkel, supra
note 3, at 364-65 nn.24-26.James Otis,Jr., Attorney General of Massachusetts, was another strong
opponent of the writs. N. LASSON, supra note 3, at 51-78.
14. See F. STIMSON, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (1908); Atkinson,
supra note 3, at 361 nn.1-2; Fraenkel, supra note 3, at 12 n.9.
15. Atkinson, supra note 3, at 366 n.30 (citing, Annals of Congress 1789-91 (Gales & Seaton
1854)): 2 G. BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (1882); F. THORPE, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1901). See also A. HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA (1974).
16. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Boyd the defendant was forced, under S 5 of the Act ofJune 22,
1874, 18 Stat. 186, to produce invoices for 29 cases of plate glass he had received. Id. at 618. The
glass was imported and subject to duties that were not paid. Id. at 617-18. Under § 12 of the Act,
the goods were forfeited. Id. at 617. The defendant appealed, claiming that in a case for forfeiture, no
evidence can be compelled from the defendants themselves. Id. at 618. See Act ofJune 22, 1874, ch.
391, § 12, 18 Stat. 186 (repealed 1890).
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First, Justice Bradley declared that any procedure, regardless of
form, that accomplished the result intended by the unauthorized
search would violate the fourth amendment.' 7 Second, the court
relied on the fourth amendment itself rather than some judicially
fashioned exclusionary rule as the basis for forbidding compulsory
production of private papers.18 Third, the Court declared a fourth
amendment violation even though a statute expressly authorized
the government to receive the evidence produced from the search
incident to the compulsory order. 19 Fourth, like Lord Camden,
Justice Bradley linked the freedom from unreasonable searches to
the privilege against self-incrimination. 20 Fifth, Justice Bradley
distinguished between searches for stolen property or contraband
and searches for things not illegal in themselves, such as books,
papers, or the plate glass invoices in Boyd.21 Finally, the opinion
showed that the fourth amendment applied to cases of forfeiture as
well as criminal prosecutions. 22 Both the dissent and legal scholars,
however, criticized Boyd as being unnecessarily broad. 23
Unlike Entick, Boyd was short lived. The Supreme Court
demonstrated how much less constraining stare decisis was in
17. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886). Justice Bradley said that even though no
search and seizure was actually involved in this case (there was no forcible entry into the defendant's
house; nor was a search conducted), the result - "forcing from a party evidence against himself" -
was nonetheless the same, and repugnant, therefore, to the fourth amendment. Id.
18. Id. This issue of Boyd, as stated by Justice Bradley, was whether the compulsory production
of the defendant's private records was an unreasonable search and seizure and thus, violative of the
fourth atmendment. Id.
19. 116 U.S. at 620-24. See Act ofJune 22, 1874, ch. 391, § 12, 18 Stat. 186 (repealed 1890).
20. 116 U.S. at 633-35. Justice Bradley noted the intimate relationship between the fourth and
lifth amendments, pointing out that the
Iunreasonable searches and seizures" condemned in the Fourth Amendment are
almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against
himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and
compelling a man "in a criminal case to be a witness against himself," which is
condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an
"unreasonable search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 633.
21. Id. at 623. In making the distinction, Justice Bradley said:
The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable to duties and
concealed to avoid the payment thereof, are totally different things from a search for
and seizure of a man's private books and papers for the purpose of obtaining
information.., or of using them as evidence. . . . In the one case, the government is
entitled to the possession of the property; in the other it is not.
Id.
22. Id. at 633. Justice Bradley explained that although the Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 391, 18
Stat. 186 "expressly excludes criminal proceedings from its operation," and thus circumvents the
litcral terms of the fourth and fifth amendments, the Government's actions nonetheless violated the
spirit ofthe amendments. Id.
23. On Boyd see generally N. LASSON, supra note 3, at 107-10; Corwin, The Supreme Court's
Construction qfthe Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MIcH. L. REV. 1, 191 (1930); Nelson, Search and Seizure:
Bqoyd v. United States, 9 A.B.A.J. 773 (1923); Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and
Seizure, 8 A.B.A.J. 479 (1922).
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America than in England in Adams v. New York. 24 The issue in
Adams was whether the mere receipt at trial of evidence seized in an
unlawful search constituted reversible error. 25 Although several
lower federal and state courts relying on Boyd had reached a
contrary result, 26 the Supreme Court in Adams upheld a state
criminal conviction against the exact kind of fourth and fifth
amendment challenge the Court had, perhaps precipitously,
invited in Boyd. Adams argued that the state court's receipt into
evidence of papers containing his handwriting, which were seized
from his office pursuant to a warrant that authorized a search for
gambling materials, violated the fourth and fifth amendments. 27
He maintained that those amendments were applicable to his state
action through the privileges and immunities clause of the
fourteenth amendment.28 The Court rejected his arguments,
stating that there had been no denial of any privileges or
immunities. 29 The Court stated that it did not want to detract from
the authority of Boyd, 30 but it did exactly that, taking one giant step
backwards. Justice Day opined that if evidence was pertinent to an
24. 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
25. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 587 (1904).
26. Courts in the following cases refused to admit evidence wrongfully seized: United States v.
Flagg, 233 F. 481 (2d Cir. 1916) (defendant's books and papers at his place of business were seized
after a warrantless search); United States v. Wong, 94 F. 832 (D. Vt. 1899) (Government wanted
wrongfully seized letters admitted as evidence in a deportation case); Town of Blacksburg v. Beam,
104 S.C. 146, 88 S.E. 441 (1916) (chief of police searched defendant, seized the key to defendant's
trtick, opened it, and seized whiskey therein, all without benefit of a warrant); State v. Sheridan, 121
Iowa 164, 96 N.W. 730 (1903) (improperly issued search warrant rendered inadmissible evidence
seized while searching defendant's house); Blum v. State, 94 Md. 375, 51 A. 26 (1902) (defendants
voluntarily turned over business records, but not for purposes of giving the State criminal evidence
against them); State v. Slamon, 73 Vt. 212, 50 A. 1097 (1901) (seized letter was not particularly
described in the warrant, so it was inadmissible).
27. Adams, 192 U.S. at 594. In Adams, the defendant was convicted of the crime of possessing
gambling paraphernalia used in the game known as policy. Id. at 586. Evidence received at trial
included some of the defendant's private papers seized in the raid of his premises. Id. at 587. The
defendant claimed that seizure of these papers, which had no relation whatever to the game of policy,
violated his fourth amendment rights. Id.
28. Id. at 587-88.
29. Id. at 594. The Court stated that:
[W]e do not feel called upon to discuss the contention that the Fourteenth Amendment
has made the provisions of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States, so far as they relate to the right of the people to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures and protect them against being compelled to
testify in a criminal case against themselves, privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States of which they may not be deprived by the action of the States. An.
examination of this record convinces us that there has been no violation of these
constitutional restrictions. ...
Id.
30. Id. at 597. The Adams Court distinguished Boyd, noting that in Adams the papers were seized
pursuant to a legitimate search warrant issued in an attempt to find gambling paraphernalia. Id. In
Boyd there was no search warrant; there was simply an order to produce the evidence. Id.
This turnaround from Boyd actually reaffirmed the general rule at common law that probative
evidence should be admitted regardless of source. See I S. GREENLEAF, GREENLEAF ON EVIDENCE § 254
(a) (1899).
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issue in a case, it was not important whether the evidence was
legally or illegally seized. 3 1
The Supreme Court addressed the contradiction between
Adams and Boyd in Weeks v. United States.32  In Weeks, police
conducted a warrantless search of Week's house, first alone and
then later the same day with federal agents, and seized
incriminating evidence.3 3 All the evidence seized was subsequently
admitted at Week's federal criminal trial. The Supreme Court
spurned Adams for Boyd.34 The Court refused to sanction the use of
such evidence holding that otherwise the fourth amendment would
be valueless, and might as well be stricken from the Constitution. 35
D. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AFTER WEEKS
Weeks precipitated fifty years of scholarly and judicial debate
on whether the exclusionary rule should be applied to state
proceedings. In Wolf v. Colorado36 and Irving v. California,37 two of a
31. 192 U.S. at 594-96.
32. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). On Weeks, see generally Atkinson, Prohibition andthe Doctrine of the Weeks
Case, 23 MICH. L. REV. 748 (1925); Edwards, Standing to Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw.
U. L. REV. 471 (1952); Grant, Constitutional Basis of the Rule Forbidding the Use of Illegally Seized Evidence,
15S. CALIF. L. REV. 60(1941).
33. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 386 (1914). In Weeks, a police officer arrested the
defendant at his place of employment while other officers gained access to the defendant's house,
searched it, and seized lottery tickets and other incriminating material, all without benefit of a search
warrant. Id. at 386-89.
34. Id. at 397-98. The Supreme Court held that the evidence seized by the local police acting
alone could be admitted into evidence but that the evidence seized by the federal agents could not be
admitted into evidence. Id. at 398. The Court suggested there existed other avenues of redress
against the local police (those who violated an individual's rights other than the federal government
and its agencies). Id.
The Court attempted to distinguish Adams on grounds that Adams had waived any objection to
introduction of evidence when he failed to seek return of evidence prior to trial. In such a situation, a
court will not permit a collateral issue to be raised as to the source of competent evidence. Id. The
Court noted there was a timely request for return of the property in Weeks, and concluded the search
in Weeks was unreasonable while that in Adams had been reasonable. Id. at 396.
35. Id. at 393-94. The language could be interpreted as meaning the Supreme Court was basing
its holding on the fourth amendment itself. If the Court meant the fourth amendment demanded
exclusion of such evidence because unless it was excluded the amendment would be a nullity, the
fourth amendment would seem to be the basis for the holding.
An alternative interpretation is that the Court created a judicial remedy not based on the fourth
amendment but rather on the Court's power to control lower court proceedings. Scholars have
adopted this interpretation and consequently they trace the exclusionary rule to Weeks, not Boyd.
Perhaps this is as the Court intended, but any difference in basis for the rulings in Boyd and Weeks
may have been an attempt by the Court to distinguish and circumvent the intervening case of Adams.
See Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather Than an
"Empirical Proposition?", 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565 (1983); Mathias, The Exclusionary Rule Revisited,
28 Loy. L. REV. 1 (1982).
In any event, prohibiting the use of illegally seized evidence in Weeks on a judicially created and
imposed rule of supervision over lower court processes left open the question of whether Congress
might supercede a judicially imposed rule over lower court operations by authorizing particular
evidence-gathering acts. See Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 39-40 (1949) (Black,J., concurring).
36. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
37. 347 U.S. 128 (1954). On Wofand Irvine see generally Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure,
Federalism and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1950); Fraenkel, Search and Seizure Developments in
Federal Law Since 1948, 41 IA. L. REV. 67 (1955); Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State
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parade of cases refusing to extend the exclusionary rule to state
proceedings, the Court identified other remedies for unlawful
police conduct. The Court noted that if law enforcement officials
willfully deprived a United States citizen of a right or privilege
secured by the fourteenth amendment (in Wolf and Irving, the
fourth amendment right to be secure in one's home), the unlawful
conduct would give rise to a federal cause of action under title
eighteen, section 242 of the United States Code. 38
The Court took a half-step forward in Elkins v. United States, 39
when the Court abolished the doctrine that in federal prosecutions,
illegally obtained evidence was inadmissible if seized by federal
officers, but admissible if seized by state officers.40 The final blow
was struck in Mapp v. Ohio, 4 1 when the Court held that any
evidence unconstitutionally obtained is inadmissible in any court,
whether state or federal.4 2
Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REV. 1083 (1959); Knowlton, The Supreme Court, Mapp
v. Ohio and Due Process of Law, 49 IA. L. REV. 14 (1963); Reynard, Freedom from Unreasonable Search and
Seizure - A Second Class Constitutional Right, 25 IND. L. J. 259 (1950); Rudd, Present Significance of
Constitutional Guaranties Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 18 U. CINN. L. REV. 387 (1949);
Comment, Wolf v. California and Unreasonable Search and Seizure in California, 38 CALIF. L. REv. 498
(1950).
38. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 137 (1954). State and common law actions were
catalogued in Wolf 338 U.S. at 30-31 n.l, and a report offederal actions was presented in Irvine, 347
U.S. at 153-54. See 18 U.S.C. S242.
39. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). In Elkins, the defendants were convicted of intercepting and divulging
telephone communications and of conspiracy to do so, in violation of 47 U.S.C. 5 501 and 605 and
18 US.C. 5 371. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 206 (1960). Evidence against the defendants
included tape recordings and a recording machine. That evidence was illegally seized. Id. at 207. It
was, however, admitted in evidence against the defendants. Id. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that evidence obtained by state officers in a search which, if conducted by federal officers,
would have violated the "unreasonable searches and seizures" clause of the fourth amendment is
inadmissible over the defendant's timely objection in a federal criminal trial. Id. at 223.
40. Id. at 223. On Elkins, see generally Berman & Oberst, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by an
Unconstitutional Search and Seizure - Federal Problems, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 525 (1960); Eichner, The
"Silver Platter' -- No Longer Used for Serving Evidence in Federal Courts, 13 U. FLA. L. REv. 311 (1960);
(;rant, The Tarnished Silver Platter: Federalism and Admissibility of lllegally Seized Evidence, 8 U.C.L.A. L.
R .v. 1 (1961).
41. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). On Mapp see generally Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A
Requiem for Wolf 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 1; Broeder, The Decline and Fall of Wolf v. Colorado, 41 NEB. L.
RF.v. 185 (1961); Burns, Mapp v. Ohio: An All American Mistake, 19 DEPAUL L. REx'. 80 (1969);
Kamisar, Public Safety vs. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories, - 53 J. CRtM. L,
CRIxtINOLO;Y & POLICE Sct. 171 (1962); LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: TheJudge's Role
in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MtCH. L. REV. 987 (1965); Oakes, Studying the
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970); Rogers, The Fourth Amendment
and Evidence Obtained by a Government Agent's Trespass, 42 NEB. L. REV. 166 (1962); Thompson,
Unconstitutional Search and Seizure and the Myth of Harmless Constitutional Error, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 457
(1967), Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L. J. 319; Wilson, Perspectives of
Alappv. Ohio, 11 U. KAN. L. REV. 423(1963).
42. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Justice Clark wrote for the majority as follows:
[Wfe once again examine Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right to privacy
free from unreasonable state intrusion, and... are led by it to close the only courtroom
door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of
that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that... conduct.
We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.
Id. at 654-55.
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Weeks had left open other avenues of redress, the Court in Wolf
had mapped those avenues, and Mapp observed their dead ends.
Justice Clark described the reconciliation of state and federal law as
an end to the war between the Constitution and common sense. He
lauded the holding for its settling effect, giving the individual his
constitutional guarantees, the police the honest law enforcement to
which they were entitled, and the courts the judicial integrity so
necessary to the true administration of justice. 43
Notwithstanding the calming assurances of Justice Clark in
Mapp, debate over the exclusionary rule continued and still
continues. Criticism of the exclusionary rule was long led by Justice
Black."4 Winds of change were - forecast by Justice White's
endorsement in Stone v. Powell of a good faith exception to the
rule.4 5 Justice White reiterated his view in Illinois v. Gates46 and
catalogued Supreme Court limitations of the exclusionary rule.
The Court has been hesitant to expand the scope of the rule. In
a series of decisions, the Court limited standing to raise
exclusionary rule objections to criminal defendants on trial.47 The
43. Id. at 660.
44. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 493-510 (1971) (Black,J., concurring
and dissenting); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 39-40 (1949) (Black, J., concurring); G. DUNNE.
Huc;o BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION (1977); J. FRANK, MR. JUSTICE BLACK: THE MAN AND
His OPINIONS (1949).
45. 428 U.S. 465, 537-39 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). In Powell, Justice White stated that
Wleek, and Mapp "had overshot their mark insofar as they aimed to deter lawless action by law
cnfii'eii t personnel .... " Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
Alt .oug J stice White did not advocate the abolishment of the exclusionary rule, he stated:
I ait nevertheless of the view that the rule should be substantially modified so as to
prevent its application in those many circumstances where the evidence at issue was
seized by an officer acting in the good-faith belief that his conduct comported with
cxisting law and having reasonable grounds for this belief.
/d.
46. 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2336-51 (1983) (White, J., concurring in the judgment). In Gates, the
iiajoritv held that the issue of modification of the exclusionary rule was not properly before the Court
and therefore refused to rule on the issue. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2321 (1983). Justice
White disagreed with that position. Id. at 2336 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). The
Supreie Court reversed the Illinois Supreme Court and held that the police seizure of a quantity of
drugs in the defendant's possession was proper because the search warrant was backed by sufficient
probable cause. Id. at 2336. Justice White would also have reversed the Illinois Supreme Court, but
the basis for his decision would have been the good faith actions of the police officers in seizing the
evidence. Id. at 2336 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice White stated "it was fully
reasonable for the Bloomingdale, Illinois police to believe that their search of respondents' house and
automobile comported with the Fourth Amendment as the search was conducted pursuant to a
judicially-issued warrant." Id.
47. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980) (defendants charged with crimes of
possession may only claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule if their own fourth amendment rights
have in fact been violated); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (defendant did not have
standing to challenge validity of the search for drugs of another's purse because defendant did not
have a legitimate expectation of privacy); Rakas v. Illinois (armed robbery defendants had no
standinig to challenge search of vehicle and seizure of weapons and ammunition because the vehicle
did not belong to the defendants and they did not assert ownership of the weapons); Brown v. United
States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973) (defendants lacked standing to contest search of premises because they
were not on the premises at the time of the search, they held no proprietary or possessory interest in
the premises, and they were not charged with an offense that included, as an essential element of the
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Supreme Court refused to extend the rule to grand jury
proceedings. 48 The Court permitted the use in a federal civil suit of
evidence illegally seized by state officials on grounds that the social
costs of exclusion outweighed the probability of deterring unlawful
police conduct. 49 The Court also approved use of illegally seized
evidence to impeach defendants testifying on their own behalf,50
allowed testimony of a live witness notwithstanding the fact that the
testimony was derived from a concededly unconstitutional search,5 1
and refused to exclude evidence where law enforcement agents
acted in good faith reliance upon laws subsequently ruled
unconstitutional.5 2 These rulings might be considered clarifications
of rather than restrictions on the exclusionary rule. It certainly
seems, however, that they narrow the broad pronouncement in
Weeks that illegally obtained evidence should be returned to its
owner and its introduction into evidence denied.
E. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS: SHEPPARD AND LEON
A Court majority side-stepped the exclusionary rule issue
during the 1982 term by reversing Gates on procedural grounds.
Two cases briefed and argued in the 1983 term, however, squarely
present the question of whether the exclusionary rule should be
modified, for example to allow evidence obtained in a good faith
oflense, possession of the seized evidence at the time of the search and seizure); Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (defendants lacked standing to assert electronic surveillance by
govcrnment tainted their convictions because government did not violate their personal fourth
amendment rights); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (defendant had no standing to
challenge admissibility of heroin seized from a third party).
48. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). In Calandra, Justice White, writing for
the majority, stated that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct and
to effectuate fourth amendment guarantees. Id. at 347. However, he said, "the exclusionary rule has
never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all
persons . . . [Tlhe application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial
objectives are thought most efficaciously served." Id. at 348. Justice White felt the damage the
exclusionary rule would cause to grand jury proceedings outweighed the benefit of any deterrent
effect. Id. at 354.
49. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976). Injanis the Court stated that "the enforcement
of admittedly valid laws would be hampered by so extending the exclusionary rule, and, as is nearly
always the case with the rule, concededly relevant and reliable evidence would be rendered
unavailable." Id. at 447. It said the rule's deterrent purpose would not be served by extending it to
civil cases because the police were already punished by the exclusion of evidence in the criminal case.
Id. at 448.
50. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (suppressed evidence was admitted against
defendant after he denied knowing anything about it); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954)
(evidence regarding improperly seized heroin was admitted against defendant after he denied having
bought, sold, or possessed heroin).
51. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978) (exclusionary rule is invoked with
reluctance when it would suppress the testimony of a live witness).
52. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (defendant's arrest, made in good faith reliance
on an ordinance subsequently ruled unconstitutional, was valid, so drugs found in search should be
allowed as evidence); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (warrantless automobile search
Conducted by Border Patrol near Mexican border was valid because it was conducted prior to a
Supreme Court decision rendering such searches unconstitutional).
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belief that the search and seizure were consistent with the
reasonableness and other requirements of the fourth amendment.
In Massachusetts v. Sheppard3 the state trial court refused to
suppress evidence despite finding that the search warrant used to
find the evidence failed to specifically list the items that were
subsequently seized. 54 An affidavit listing those items existed but
was not attached to the warrant or incorporated by reference. 5 The
state trial court refused to apply the exclusionary rule, finding that
"the actual search undertaken was within the limits of the authority
the police thought reasonably had been granted. ' 56 The court
concluded that police conduct would not be altered by excluding
the otherwise relevant and reliable evidence, and therefore the only
consequence of applying the rule would be to impair the truth-
finding function of the jury by keeping probative evidence from
them. 57 The court thus distinguished between errors committed by
the judicial officer in issuing the warrant, the situation in Sheppard,
and fourth amendment violations by law enforcement officers in
executing the warrant.,
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts acknowledged
the trial court's distinction between judicial and police blunders
and agreed the exclusionary rule was not tailored to deterring
judicial misconduct. 58 The court questioned suppression of
evidence as a deterrent where police conduct was proper, the
defendant was not prejudiced by the judicial officer's error, and an
appellate court clearly identified the judicial officer's error of law as
a guide to future conduct. 59 Nevertheless, the court reversed the
trial court on the grounds that the Supreme Court had yet to
approve an exception to the exclusionary rule under such
circumstances. 60
A single dissent argued that failure to attach the existing
affidavit that described the items to be seized to the revised warrant
was a harmless error with Draconian consequences. 6' The sacrifice
of such reliable and highly probative evidence constituted, the
dissent maintained, "a dedication to rigid formality.
53. 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725 (1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3534 (1983).
54. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, __, 441 N.E.2d 725, 730 (1982), cert. granted,
103 S. Ct. 3534 (1983).
55. Id. at -, 441 N.E.2d at 728.
56. Id. at_, 441 N.E.2d at 730.
57. Id.
58. Id. at ____, 441 N.E.2d at 735. The court stated that suppression of a particular piece of
evidence under the exclusionary rule may not be as effective as disincentive to a neutral judge as it
would be to the police. Id. This is because "ideally a judge is impartial as to whether a particular
piece-of evidence is admitted or a particular defendant convicted." Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at ,441 N.E.2d at 736.
61. Id. at__ , 441 N.E.2d at 746 (Lynch, I., dissenting).
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commanded neither by the Constitution nor logic. "62
In United States v. Leon, 63 the federal district court suppressed
evidence obtained from a search conducted under a warrant issued
by a state judge. 64 The district court found that the police affidavit
used to obtain the warrant relied, in material part, on a
confidential police informant whose reliability and credibility had
not been established. 65 The court found that other details in the
warrant concerned another transaction or were as consistent with
innocence as with guilt. 66 The district court concluded that
although the police apparently acted in good faith, because the
informant's credibility and reliability were questionable the
warrant was not supported by probable cause. 67 The court ordered
the evidence gathered in the search excluded. 68 A panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, over one dissent, affirmed
the suppression order and specifically refused to recognize a good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 69
Supreme Court briefs and arguments in Leon and Sheppard
forcused on the cases' particular facts, the Government's
arguments that a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
should be adopted, and the competing interests of society, law
enforcement, and the criminal defendant. 70 Justice O'Connor
expressed concern over the distinction in Sheppard between judicial
error and police misconduct. 71 She inquired whether the police had
an obligation to execute the warrant as written and return to the
magistrate when the warrant failed to specify the place to be
searched or the items to be seized.72 The particular facts in Sheppard
may beg the question because in that case an affidavit existed fully
describing everything, the judicial error being the failure to
incorporate that affidavit by reference or attach it to the revised
warrant. 73 Defendant's counsel in Leon emphasized that the totality
of the circumstances rationale in Gates obviated any need for
modifying the exclusionary rule.
74
62. Id.
63. /01 F.2d 187 (9th Cir.)(table), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3535 (1983).
64. Appellant's Brief at __ , United States v. Leon, 701 F.2d 187 (9th Cir.) (table), cert.
g'ranted, 103 S. Ct. 3535 (1983), argument reported at 52 U.S.L.W. 3541 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1984) (No.
82-963).
65. Id. at __.
66. Id. at __.
67. Id. at .
68. Id. at__.
69. Id. at __.
70. 52 U.S.L.W. at 3542-43.
71. Argument, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 52 U.S.L.W. 3541 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1984).
72. 52 U.S.L.W. at 3541-42.
73. Id.
74. Appellant's Brief at __ , United States v. Leon, 701 F.2d 187 (9th Cir.) (table), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 3535 (1983), argument reported at 52 U.S.L.W. 3542.
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Speculation about the Supreme Court's decisions in Sheppard
and Leon is probably less worthwhile than identifying the reasons
for continuing or abandoning the rule. Reconciling interests
protected by the fourth amendment with the obligations of law
enforcement officers and public outcry to punish the guilty is
another consideration. The Court's decision in Sheppard will not be
the last word on the subject. Nevertheless, the Burger Court's
preoccupation with the ultimate question of guilt, thereby avoiding
and disregarding procedural and technical sand traps, suggests that
unless the Court majority views abandonment or modification of
the exclusionary rule as impaling the integrity of the criminal trial
process, the rule will at least be modified. The Burger Court has
shown greatest interest in those rights that protect the innocent,
such as the right to counsel and the prohibition against coerced
confessions, and less interest in those rights that may serve to
protect the guilty, such as the exclusionary rule.7 5 This hierarchy,
based on the likelihood that a denial of the particular right claimed
will result in conviction of the innocent, suggests that when
convictions appear reliable but are challenged on technical grounds
of police misconduct or judicial error, the Court will limit rather
than expand defendants' rights. The Court's preoccupation with
seeing the guilty convicted may result in modification or
abandonment of the exclusionary rule.
III. ANALYSIS
A. THE RULE
Proponents of the exclusionary rule contend that the
overriding public policy considerations of fairness, judicial
integrity, and the fourth amendment prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures are more important than any
individual criminal conviction.7 6 By corollary, they argue that it is
75. Compare Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (there is no basis for distinguishing between
the guilt and penalty stage of a criminal trial as far as the protection of the fifth amendment privilege
against self incrimination is concerned); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (an accused,
having expressed desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further
interrogation until counsel has been made available to him); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264
(1980) (Government violated defendant's right to counsel by intentionally creating a situation likely
to induce an incriminating statement) with Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (for fourth
amendment purposes, a search warrant carries with it the limited authority to detain occupants of
premises while search is conducted); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (evidence
was adequate to support finding that defendant voluntarily consented to accompany officers and
submit to search); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (illegally obtained evidence,
although inadmissible in Government's case in chief, is admissible to impeach the defendant's direct
testimony).
76. See, e.g., Canon, The Exclusionary Rule: A Conservative Argumentfor Its Retention, 23 S. TEx. L.J.
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less important that courts admit all reliable and relevant evidence
than it is that courts insure that proper evidence gathering methods
are followed and constitutionally defective methods are
abandoned. 77 Specifically, proponents maintain: (1) exclusion
preserves and protects the integrity of the courts; (2) the fourth
amendment was adopted to protect individuals from police
misconduct; (3) that protection can best be accomplished by
excluding illegally seized evidence; (4) exclusion of illegally seized
evidence does not of itself free the guilty: it merely returns the
status quo so that things are as they would have been but for the
unlawful intrusion; thus, a conviction can still be obtained using
legally seized evidence. 78 Several functions of the warrant may be
frustrated if the warrant, like that in Sheppard, fails to specify the
items to be seized. For example, defendants may not be provided
notice, and police may be denied guidance. In addition, if good
faith or reasonable mistake exceptions to the exclusionary rule are
recognized, whenever a warrant is subsequently challenged, the
police will try to bring in new or additional information beyond
that in the warrant to show that the magistrate authorized a search
other than that spelled out in the warrant. 79
Critics of the exclusionary rule counter: (1) admission of
evidence should be predicated solely upon its reliability and
relevance; (2) excluding reliable evidence will often free the guilty
and thereby work against police efforts to eliminate crime.80 They
note that little evidence suggests that the rule has had or will have a
deterrent effect when the police are operating in good faith.8  As
championed by Solicitor General Lee, the new standard would
require judges to determine first if there had been a fourth
amendment violation and then whether a reasonable mistake of law
559 (1982); Kamisar, A Defense of the Eiclusionary Rule, 15 CRIM. L. BULL. 5 (1979): Oakes, supra note
41.
77. See, e.g., Canon, supra note 76, at 578-82.
78. See, e.g., supra note 76.
79. See 52 U.S.L.W. at 3544.
80. See Friendly, The Bill ofRights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 951-53
(1965): Posner, Excessive Sanctions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 WASH. L. REV. 635
(1982): Wingo, Growing Disillusionment with the Exclusionary Rule, 25 Sw. L. J. 573, 584-85 (1971);
Wright. Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEX. L. REV. 736, 737 (1972). See also
Canon, supra note 76, at 560; Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and Its
Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U. L. Q. 621, 656-83; Miles, Decline of the Fourth Amendment: Time to Overrule
Mapp v. Ohio, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 9 (1977); Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid
Evidence?, 62JUDICATURE 215, 218 (1978); Note, The Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure: Examination
and Prognosis, 20 U. KAN. L. REV. 768 (1972).
81. 52 U.S.L.W. at 3544. On the good faith exception see Allen, supra note 41, at 33; Friendly,
supra note 80, at 951-53; Geller, Is the Evidence In on the Exclusionary Rule, 67 A.B.A.J. 1642 (1981);
LaFave & Remington, supra note 41; Oakes, supra note 41, at 709; Comment, On the Limitations oj
Empirical Evaluations of the Fclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiotta Research and United States v. Calandra,
69 Nw. U. L. REv. 740 (1974); Note, Reason and the Fourth Amendment: The Burger Court and the
Exclusionary Rule, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 139 (1977).
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would justify admission of the evidence. 82 He suggested that courts
could automatically reject police ignorance as justification for a
reasonable mistake. The police could be required to show both that
they acted in good faith and that their actions were reason-
able. 83 Thus, in Sheppard, the police would have to satisfy Justice
O'Connor that their search was both conducted in good faith and
that their action in failing to return and have the judge attach the
affidavit to the warrant was reasonable. 84
In answer to those advocating modification, the exclusionary
rule's defenders respond: (1) Supreme Court decisions have
removed abuses; (2) a reasonable mistake exception would
encourage ignorance of the law as a defense of misconduct and then
require courts to make a subjective determination concerning the
executing officer's state of mind absent proof of malicious conduct
or perjury; (3) a good faith exception would pass to the police the
courts' responsibility for determining whether probable cause
existed.8 5 On the subjectiveness issues, Professor Wayne LaFave
has commented that if an exception. to the rule were adopted, the
courts would lose control of the fourth amendment the same way
they lost control of the fifth amendment under the voluntariness
test governing admission of confessions before Miranda. 86
B. ALTERNATIVES
If, as retired Justice Potter Stewart has suggested, the problem
82. 52 U.S.L.W. at 3542-44. On the good faith exception see United States v. Williams, 622
F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981); Ashdown, Good Faith, the
Exclusionary Remedy, and Rule-Oriented Adjudication in the Criminal Process, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 335
(1983); Bernardi, The Exclusionary Rule: Isa Good Faith Standard Needed to Preserve a Liberal Interpretation
qf the Fourth Amendment?, 30 DEPAUL L. REV. 51 (1980); Brown, The Good Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule, 23 S. TEX. L. J. 655 (1982); Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations:
Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEO. L. J. 1361 (1981); Comment, The Exclusionary Rule
Revisited: Good Faith in Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure, 70 Ky. L. J. 879 (1982); Note, The Good
Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule - Adoption by Williams and Richmond, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 83
(1982). See also ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIMES FINAL REPORT (1981).
83. 52 U.S.L.W. at 3542-44. On the "reasonableness" element in a reasonable mistake or good
faith exception, see Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable" Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule, 69J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635 (1978); Bernardi, supra note 82, at 104; Note,
7he Proposed Good Faith Test for Fourth Amendment Exclusion Compared to the § 1983 Good Faith Defense:
ProblensandPropspects, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 915, 933 (1978).
84. 52 U.S.L.W. 3546-71.
85. On criticism of the good faith exception see Fyfe, Enforcement Workshop: Roadblocks and Roving
Stops, 18 CRIM. L. BULL. 346 (1982); Goodpaster, An Essay on Ending the Exclusionary Rule, 33
HASIIN;s L.J. 1065 (1982); LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright
Lines" and "Good Faith ", 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307 (1982); Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 CEo. L. J. 365 (1981);
Uviller, The Acquisition of Evidence for Criminal Prosecution: Some Constitutional Premises and Practices in
Transition, 35 VAND. L. REV. 501 (1982). Comment, The Emerging Good Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 112 (1981).
86. Fitzhugh, The New Exclusionary Cases, 70 A.B.A.J. 58, 61 (1984) (quoting Prof. Wayne
LaFave).
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is with the fourth amendment, not the exclusionary rule, the
amendment could be amended to read:
(1) The right of the people to be secure in their houses,
papers, and effects must be balanced with society's
interests in law enforcement and conviction of those
guilty of crimes. Judicial and law enforcement officers
should act to insure evidence gathering procedures are
reasonable. Normally, this requires the use of a
warrant, issued by an independent judicial officer,
based upon probable cause, and supported by an
attached oath or affirmation describing the place to be
searched and the person(s) or thing(s) to be seized.
(2) Notwithstanding section one, any evidence that is
relevant and reliable is admissible at trial regardless of
its source.
(3) Whenever evidence gathering or other actions result
in a deprivation of the right to be secure from
unreasonable searches such injury shall be redressed as
Congress provides; or if Congress does not provide, in
any state or federal court by a tort action based on this
amendment 87
Other remedies could be statutorily created or judicially
developed. Congress could authorize suits under specific statutes or
rules, for example, by enlarging title 18, section 242, or title 28,
section 1983, of the United States Code. Fourth amendment rights
are as worthy of protection as the right to correct credit
information, which is protected by the Truth in Lending Act.
Alternatively, Congress could set up an independent
administrative procedure like that for veterans' claims, or sanction
administrative procedure like those the Supreme Court
recommended for processing prisoner property claims in Parratt v.
Taylor.88 Either would isolate the fourth amendment deprivation
proceeding from any state or federal criminal trial. Administrative
proceedings would solve the problems that arise when judges have
to decide claims against judges and plaintiff-criminal-defendants
have to win jury suits against the police. The United States Courts
of Appeals could review such proceedings. A "clearly erroneous"
1
87. Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond. The Origins, Development, and Future of the
Fxclusionary Rules in Search and Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365 (1983).
88. 451 U.S. 527 (1981). See Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman, 14 AM. U. L. REv. 1 (1969)
(advocating a civil tribunal).
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or "against the clear weight of the evidence" standard of review
could be employed, or review could be limited to seeing that
process was not denied.
Alternatively, Congress could establish police guidelines by
statute or regulation. For example, police regulations could spell
out all exceptions to the warrantrequirement or to the requirement
that the warrant must list the items to be seized. Courts could
ensure that the guidelines were consistent with fourth amendment
dictates. When acting within the guidelines, police conduct would
be presumed to be reasonable. This would ensure uniformity of
treatment, limit the broad discretion police officers exercise, and
provide a standard for evaluation. Actions outside the guidelines,
not justified as reasonable, could be punished by named penalties,
exclusion of evidence, or both. 8 9
Courts could encourage use of judicially recognized tort or
Bivens9 ° actions. But even if the Court authorizes such suits, 9'
judgments are difficult to obtain against police and judicial officers
because of, respectively, qualified good faith and absolute judicial
immunity. 92 Victims, particularly innocent victims, of fourth
amendment violations are reluctant to prosecute, and awards are
likely to be nominal. If juries refused to make awards against
officials, a right to non-jury trials could be recognized.
The exclusionary rule could be limited to lesser crimes,
abolishing it, for example, in murder trials. 93 Such differentiation,
however, would create havoc in plea bargaining. A defendant
charged with first degree murder would have a very strong motive
to plead guilty to a lesser offense if incriminating illegally seized
evidence could be introduced in a murder trial. In addition,
89. For analysis of jurisdictions employing administrative remedies, see Bradley, The
Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1032 (1983); Comment, Comparative Analysis of the
Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 57 TUL. L. REV. 648(1980). See also Kaczynski, TheAdmissibility of
Illegally Obtained Evidence: American and Foreign Approaches Compared, 101 MIL. L. REV. 83(1983).
90. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotic Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). For criticism of such
tort remedies, see 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, at 30-33; Dellinger, Of Rti4 hts and Remedies: TheConstitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1562-63 (1972); Morris, The Exclusionary Rule,
Deterrence, and Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 57 WASH. L. REV. 647 (1982); but see Blumrosen,
Contempt of Court and Unlawful Police Action, 11 RUTGERS L. REV. 526 (1957); Foote, Tort Remedies for
Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493 (1955).
91. The Court has exhibited a kind of approach-avoidance toward such actions. Compare Haring
v. Prosise, 103 S. Ct. 2368 (1983) (plea of guilty did not bar subsequent § 1983 action challenging
legality of search that produced inculpatory evidence) with Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980)
(inability to obtain habeas corpus relief upon fourth amendment claim does not render doctrine of
collateral estoppel inapplicable to 5 1983 suit).
92. The Court may simply act to restrict such suits in certain circumstances. See Chappel v.
Wallace, 103 S.Ct. 2362 (1983) (enlisted military personnel may not maintain suit to recover
damages from a superior officer for alleged constitutional violations).
93. See Allen, supra note 37, at 36; Coe, The ALl Substantiality Test: A Flexible Approach to the
Exclusionary Sanction, 10 GA. L. REV. 1 (1975); Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L.
REv. 1027, 1037(1974).
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prosecutors would stretch to charge offenses exempted from the
rule to get illegally seized items admitted into evidence.
Problems with these alternatives were outlined by Chief
Justice Burger in Stone v. Powell.94 Chief Justice Burger explained
that even if legislatures were to act, no assurance exists that courts
would abolish the rule. 95 He opined that the greatest shortcoming
of leaving the defense of the fourth amendment to the exclusionary
rule is that it offers no relief to those victims of overzealous police
work who never appear in court. 96
C. A SOLUTION
No specific "answer" to the dilemma is endorsed. Rather, it is
recommended that the question be reformed. As long as the
protection of individual rights under the fourth amendment and the
problematic exclusionary rule are treated as a single issue, the baby
will be thrown out with the bath water, or more precisely, the
criminal will be thrown out with the evidence. The proper
questions are: (1) should there be either protection from or redress
for grievances for fourth amendment violations? and (2) when, if
ever, should relevant and reliable evidence be suppressed?
The questions should be answered independently. The first
should be answered in the affirmative, but the second is more
difficult. As long as remedies are available, courts could decide the
second question on its own merits. They might conclude that the
alternatives to the exclusionary rule were inadequate and the cost of
allowing the guilty to occasionally go free was worth the maximum
protection of individual rights afforded by the rule. Alternatively,
courts might conclude that the exclusionary rule should be
abolished. This could be predicated upon acceptance of Bivens
actions or conditioned on legislatively created redress procedures.
Courts could distinguish between the fourth and fifth amendments
by focusing on whether the constitutional violation created doubts
94. 428 U.S. 465, 496 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring). In his concurrence, Chief Justice
Burger stated as follows:
It can no longer be assumed that other branches of government will act while judges
cling to this Draconian, discredited device in its present absolutist form. Legislatures
are unlikely to create statutory alternatives, or impose direct sanctions on errant police
officers or on the public treasury by way of tort action, so long as persons who commit
serious crimes continue to reap the enormous and undeserved benefits of the
exclusionary rule.
/d. at 500-01.95. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 500-01 (1976)(Burger, CJ. concurring).
96. Id. at 501. For additional discussions of alternatives, see S. SCHESINCER, ExcLUSIONARY
lIUtsTICE (1977); Geller, supra note 80; Miles, supra note 80.
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about the guilt of the accused. Coerced confessions would be
suppressed because they are more likely to be unreliable than
voluntary confessions, but illegally seized evidence would be
admitted if relevant and reliable.
IV. SUPREME COURT ADJUDICATION
The following observations may help explain past Court
decisions and predict future Court responses, but they are offered
primarily to illustrate and explain the complexity of Supreme
Court adjudication.
A. STARE DECISIS
Both exclusionary rule defenders and critics have at different
times relied on stare decisis. The Supreme Court decisions in
Adams, Weeks, and Mapp were volcanic eruptions, but only those
who maintain that stare decisis is a fundamental principle of
American jurisprudence should be surprised. In England they have
a rule, perhaps the rule, of stare decisis (meaning the decision
stands) but in America, sometimes the decision stands and
sometimes it does not. Whether openly confessed or not, the case
history of school desegregation, rights of the accused and convicted,
and voting rights, establish beyond cavil that the Court has not
blindly followed stare decisis.
Should American jurisprudence have abandoned stare decisis?
Consistency and justice are oftentimes mutually exclusive terms,
although clarity and consistency, particularly in areas of
constitutional law, are desirable in and of themselves. But the
complexity and unpredictability of the first case that follows an
announced rule may and frequently does demand a different
response with modification or at least clarification of the newly
announced rule. 97 When judges see the nuances of their decisions
and decline logical extensions or application, should they not be
commended for their willingness to rethink instead of condemned
for their further insight and understanding? When confronted with
inconsistent prior statements or positions, John Kennedy simply
replied, "I don't think that way any more." To live is to change,
and judges both individually and collectively as a court should be
allowed to change their minds within the constraints of
constitutional adjudication. The point here is not to champion
97. Id.
98. See Amsterdam, Prespectives On The Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349 (1974).
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abolishment or modification of the exclusionary rule, but to argue
that the Supreme Court should be bound by stare decisis only to the
extent that upon considered reflection, the precedents are worth
following. The vague language of the fourth amendment in
condemning unreasonable searches leaves more than a little room
for judicial interpretation and clarification, and why should one
Court's view of the indefinite phrase bind another?
The following three points are taken and developed from the
1974 Holmes lecture delivered by Professor Anthony Amsterdam. 98
B. COURT AS COMMITTEE
The Court is a committee. 99 It is unlike those committees in
which the chairman always prevails and other members only work
for and advise the chairman or in which only the committee's
consensus is announced without dissent or explanation. On the
Court every committee member has an equal vote and voice. Many
jurists appear to view the judiciary as a representative democracy
in which it is more important to express the views of their
philosophical constituency than it is to reconcile their views with
others on the Court to produce a unified opinion. "It is far more
difficult for the Court than its critics to produce 'a single coherent
analytical framework' for decisions that the Court must make." 100
Collegiality and consensus may produce the right result but seldom
will there be an agreement on the reasons. When there is a broad
underlying philosophical agreement that results in a unified
opinion in which the whole Court agrees, the opinion is likely to
contain the consistency and lack of tension that elicits respect for
the Court, even from individuals who may disagree with the
particular holding. More frequently, a majority agrees on the result
(by necessity since the Court consists of nine members and
most issues present a binary choice) but not on the reasons.
Majority opinions are frequently fashioned from trade-offs and
compromises. What is gained in harmony in presenting a unified
front may be lost in clarity; splitting philosophical differences down
the middle may result in a fractured rationale. Finally there are
those cases in which a confused or confusing plurality come to the
same result but openly disagree on the reasons. To the extent that
the separate opinions are coherent and consistent in themselves this
may be preferable to the compromise opinion. Opinions in the
99. Id. at 350.
100. Id. (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 483 (1971)).
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latter two categories, with botn their articulated and unarticulated
compromises and trade-offs, are far less likely to evoke respect for
the Court, a clear statement of law, or guidance for future conduct.
C. HIDDEN AGENDAS
The Court may be reluctant to lay all the cards on the table. 101
It may search to find legal justifications for what it wants to do. In
both the fourth amendment search and seizure cases culminating in
Mapp and the fifth amendment cases culminating in Haynes, 10 2
Escobedo, 103 and Miranda,10 4 the swing votes may not have been
based on constitutional commandments of the fourteenth
amendment or on a balancing of amendments. Those decisions
may have been based in part on an unarticulated growing distrust
of certain state criminal trial court practices and procedures. 05 The
search for legal justifications for what the court wants to do is a fact
of adjudication. When the Court bitterly disagrees it may look to
alternative justifications. This may have led the Court to look for
solutions to the exclusionary rule dilemma other than the "good
faith" exception and to adopt in Gates'0 6 a totality of the
circumstances standard of review. In Sheppard, the Court is unlikely
to say that it distrusts state law enforcement officers or judges and
thus cannot adopt a "good faith" exception, even if that distrust is
a factor. Nor is the Court likely to articulate as the basis for its
holding, if the Court reverses Sheppard, that a majority of
Americans do not want criminal defendants to go free, especially in
murder cases, because of technical judicial or police blunders. The
Court is certainly aware that there is a natural limit to law and that
law should generally follow society's sense of fairness and justice.
The Court is not likely, however, to reverse Sheppard on grounds
that applying the exclusionary rule in Sheppard exceeds that limit.
D. CONSEQUENCES OF ADJUDICATION
Judges bear responsibility for their decisions, and that
responsibility soon teaches that application of clear and consistent
principles sometimes produces unacceptable results. 0 7 The results
101. 1d. at 350-51.
102. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
103. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U .S. 478 (1964).
104. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
105. Amsterdam, supra note 98, at 351.
106. Gates v. Illinois, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983).
107. Amsterdam, supra note 98, at 351.
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are unacceptable because of countervailing principles that the court
may or may not be willing to identify. 10 8
Few better examples could exist than the distinction between
adopting the exclusionary rule in Boyd, a forfeiture case, and
extending or applying the rule in Sheppard, a murder case. Society is
less interested in the exclusionary rule in the latter, but a defendant
has a greater interest in and need for the exclusionary rule when
charged with murder than when faced with forfeiture of property.
V. CONCLUSION
The exclusionary rule is in a state of flux. The balance may
soon shift to the majoritarian interest in convicting the guilty
through recognizing a "reasonable mistake" or "good faith"
exception to the rule. The lesson of history, however, is that the
pendulum will swing back. A political faction with a particular
philosophy may capture the White House and even attempt to pack
the Court. No single philosophy has stayed in power, though;
sooner or later successful challengers emerge and "unpack" the
Court. Also, the judiciary has proved remarkably independent.
Faith in the system and the Court to withstand particular
philosophies is justified. This optimism is not reposed in a
particular jurist, judicial philosophy, or even term of Court, but in
the process and form of government. To take one recent example
outside the fourth amendment area, in Lynch v. Donnelly1 9 the
Supreme Court upheld, against first amendment challengers, a
city's right to display a Christmas creche. While the decision seems
inconsistent with both the first amendment and Lemon v.
Kurtzman,10 it undoubtedly reflects the constitutional view of the
present Court majority and most Americans. If it goes too far or
provides precedent for other decisions that go too far, it can be
restricted.
Critics may lament the Supreme Court's two-step-forward,
one-step-backward approach. But it is a strength of our judicial
system and form of government that the Court continues to wrestle
with the issues raised in Lynch and Sheppard. In Sheppard the public
outcry to punish the defendant may not be reconcilable with the
defendant's fourth amendment rights. If the exclusionary rule is a
weakness in our criminal law, it is a strength of our individual
freedom, and the strain it places on society and our legal system
108. Id. at 351-52.
109. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
110. 403 U.S. 602(1971).
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may be better tolerated than shifted. Justice Holmes cautioned that
"where distinctions are vital rather than formal, the problems and
conflicts should be existentially endured rather than rationally
reconciled." 111 The Court may distinguish between judicial errors
and police misconduct, abolish the exclusionary rule in first degree
murder cases, or authorize a good faith or reasonable mistake
exception to the rule. But the Court may also leave the dilemma
unresolved with the exclusionary rule intact.
11. Dunne, Book Review, 80 MICH. L. REV. 652, 655(1982).
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